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ABSTRACT
The taxability of recoveries of damages on account of emotional distress remains a
complicated issue under the American federal income tax law. Recent developments due to a
controversial decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals have further added fuel to this
debate. Even if one were to argue the justifications of exempting such recoveries from income
taxation, courts do not appear to be the very appropriate kind of forum. Congress can, and in fact
does tax such recoveries and the constitutional basis of such power can hardly be doubted. As a
result, appropriate changes in the statute only can bring the desirable result of exempting such
recoveries from income taxation.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

The Internal Revenue Code1 (“IRC” or “Code”) is the most voluminous and complex of
any set of federal statutes in America. It is through these statutes that Congress exercises its
taxing power.2 There are several different types of taxes covered by these statues,3 one of which
is federal income tax. Although for the average American income tax may appear as a necessary
evil, most would agree that the federal government could not function without some type of tax.
This leads to conflicts between taxpayers and the federal government because the government is
concerned with collecting revenue and taxpayers are concerned about minimizing their tax
liability. In the process of finding a common ground, the situation is made more difficult by the
fact that an economist’s definition of income does not always comport with the Code’s definition
of income. Thus, Albert Einstein may have been correct in saying that “[T]he hardest thing in the
world to understand is the income tax.”4
This paper discusses one such example where a particular taxpayer felt that a certain type
of award she received as damages for suffering emotional distress ought not to be taxed.5 Her

1

Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9833 (2007).
See, e.g., JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
21 (13th ed. 2004).
3
The Internal Revenue Code is further divided into various subtitles and contains a variety of taxes like Income
Taxes, Estate and Gift Taxes, Employment Taxes, and Miscellaneous Excise Taxes including Excise Taxes on
Alcohol and Tobacco. See FREELAND ET. AL., supra note 2, at 6-7 (summarizing the historical evolution of different
types of taxes under internal revenue taxation).
4
See THE MACMILLAN BOOK OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC QUOTATIONS 195 (Michael Jackman ed., 1984).
5
Murphy v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, Murphy v. IRS,
Not reported in F.3d, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006) (vacating the prior opinion and
scheduling oral arguments for Apr. 23, 2007)
2

1

discomfort with the taxing of such a receipt resulted in a protracted litigation that apparently is
still far from over.6 The problem is that the IRC defines “income” in a wide and expansive
fashion, allowing exclusions only for certain specifically defined items. These exclusions are
matters of legislative privilege and grace and must not be treated as inherently excludible
because of their character or nature. The philosophy of the tax Code is that anything that can
properly fall within the catch-all definition of income is includible, whereas exclusions are
defined in a more exclusive and exhaustive manner. In other words, if a taxpayer forgets or
chooses to forget to show on a tax return a particular item of income, the taxpayer continues be
liable regardless. But, no consequences follow if the taxpayer forgets to choose to exclude an
item to which he or she is entitled to. The taxpayer simply loses the exclusion. The reason is that
if the taxpayer does not choose to take the benefit of a legislative privilege, no corresponding
obligation is created on the part of the government.
Chapter 2 of this paper gives details of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service,7

a case

remarkable for the court’s interpretation of what constitutes income. This case was subject to
much criticism after it initially was decided by the United States Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”).

6

Murphy v. IRS, Not reported in F. 3d, No. 05-5139, 2007 WL 1892238 (D.C. Cir. July 3, 2007) (rejecting Ms.
Murphy’s argument in all respects upon rehearing), see also Jeremia Coder, D.C. Circuit Reverses Course In
Murphy Redux, TAX NOTES, July 9, 88 (2007) (quoting Ms. Murphy’s Counsel that he will seek further review of
the case).
7
460 F. 3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

2

This case, in fact, became important not only for tax law scholars but also for
constitutional law scholars.8 The case and the core issues it presents justify a discussion of
constitutional law, tax law, tort law, and employment law. Chapter 3 discusses the case from
these four perspectives.
Chapter 4 provides a general critique of the pre-rehearing and the reversal of the Murphy
decision.

The paper concludes with Chapter 5, containing recommendations for statutory

changes in the tax Code for exempting income tax on damages received on account of emotional
distress to the victims under whistle-blower protection statutes.

8

See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, This One’s is for the Tax Nuts, http:// www. professorbainbridge .com/2006/08/this
_ones_for_t.html (last visited June 25, 2007); Ryan J. Donmoyer, Tax Law Ruling by Court May Encourage New
Challenges, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=azSs FNBVDjJ8& refer =us (last visited
June 25, 2007); Tax Prof Commentary after Murphy (2006), available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2
006/08/ tax_ prof_ comment.html (giving a critique of Murphy decision by law professors) (last visited June 25,
2007).
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CHAPTER 2
Background

A. The Genesis of Murphy
In Murphy, the taxpayer, Ms. Marrita Murphy, sued her former employer, the New York
Air National Guard, for emotional distress and loss of reputation.9 She alleged that her employer
both blacklisted her and gave her negative references after she disclosed environmental hazards
at the air base. She brought suit under the whistleblower provisions of the environmental
statutes.10 At a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Ms. Murphy submitted
evidence that she had suffered both mental and physical injuries as a result of her employer’s
wrongful actions.11 She introduced testimony from a physician who stated that she had suffered
both “somatic” and “emotional” injuries.12 Upon evidence of other physical manifestations of
such injuries, the ALJ awarded Ms Murphy $45,000 for emotional distress and $25,000 for
injury to her professional reputation.13 Ms. Murphy paid the requisite federal income tax on the
award and thereafter filed a claim for refund in the federal district court14, after her refund claim

9

Murphy, 460 F. 3d at 81.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. The word “somatic” means – “Corporeal; pertaining to the body as distinct from the soul, mind or psyche,” see
WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1729 (2d ed. 1967).
13
Murphy, 460 F. 3d at 81.
14
The U.S. district courts have refund jurisdiction on internal-revenue tax matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)
(providing that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action for the recovery of tax that was
assessed or collected erroneously); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (providing that no suit for a claim of refund shall be
filed in any court until a claim has been administratively decided); see generally CAMILLA E. WATSON, TAX
PROCEDURE AND TAX FRAUD IN A NUT SHELL (3d ed. 2006).
10
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was denied by the Internal Revenue Service15 (IRS). She lost the case and then appealed to the
D.C. Circuit.16
Section 61 of the IRC defines “gross income” in a very broad manner.17 Section
104(a)(2) 18 provides that “gross income” does not include the amount of any damages (other
than punitive damages) received on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.19
Since 199620 it has further provided that, for purposes of this exclusion, “emotional distress shall
not be treated as physical injury or physical sickness.”21

B. The Arguments Advanced by Ms. Murphy
1. The “Physical Injury” Argument
Ms. Murphy first argued that her award was in fact for “personal physical injury” under
Section 104(a)(2) and thus should be excludable from her gross income. In support of this
argument, she primarily pointed to her physician’s testimony that she had, in fact, suffered a
physical injury. She also relied upon her dental records, submitted to the IRS, to show that she
had suffered permanent damage to her teeth.22 She contended that she suffered substantial
physical problems that were caused by emotional distress that arose, in turn, from her employer’s

15

The IRS may assert a tax deficiency on a taxpayer in certain cases. In such situations, the taxpayer may contest
and the judicial remedy is not limited to suit in the Tax Court. The taxpayer can pay the deficiency and then file an
administrative claim for refund. Upon denial, the taxpayer can file suit in the District Court for a refund. Unlike Tax
Court, if a refund claim is heard by a District Court then the fact issues may be determined by a jury if the taxpayer
demands a jury trial. See supra note 14.
16
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 82.
17
26 U.S.C. § 61 (2007).
18
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2007).
19
Id.
20
See infra text accompanying notes 224-235.
21
26 U.S.C § 104(a)(2) (2007).
22
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 83.
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wrongful conduct and that these physical manifestations must be considered physical injuries or
physical sickness.23

2. The “Sixteenth Amendment” “Income” Argument
Ms. Murphy’s second argument, a novel one, was much more interesting. This one was
based on the definition of income at the time of the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment24 to
the U.S. Constitution. She focused upon three sources,25 all of which the U.S. Supreme Court
had quoted in O’Gilvie v. United States:26 an opinion of the U.S. Attorney General,27 a decision
of the Treasury Department,28 and a report issued by the Ways and Means Committee of the
House of Representatives.29 In O’Gilivie, the Court had analyzed the 1918 exclusionary
provision and commented that the language excluded from income those damages that are a
substitution for a victim’s physical or personal well being.30 Relying on this, Ms. Murphy
maintained that the predecessor of Section 104(a)(2) more accurately reflected the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment as understood by those who framed, adopted, and ratified it because
the statute was enacted soon after the ratification of the Amendment. Ms. Murphy also relied on
Dotson v. United States,31 a Fifth Circuit decision in which the court examined the legislative
history of Section 104(a)(2) and concluded that “Congress first enacted the personal injury

23

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, see also infra text accompanying notes 130-151.
25
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85.
26
519 U.S.79 (1996).
27
See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918) (expressing that accident insurance proceeds substitute human capital
which is the source of future periodical incomes).
28
See T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918) (holding that an amount received by an individual as the result
of a suit or compromise for personal injuries sustained in an accident is not income).
29
See H.R. REP. No. 65-767, at 9-10 (1918) (stating that under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts
received through accident or health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal
injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are required to be included in gross
income).
30
O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86 (1996).
31
87 F.3d 682 ( 5th Cir. 1996).
24

6

compensation exclusion at a time when such payments were considered a return of human
capital, and thus not constitutionally taxable “income” under the 16th Amendment.”32

C. The Counter Arguments
The IRS attacked Ms. Murphy’s arguments on every front and also invoked the general
presumption that Congress enacts laws within its constitutional limits.33 It noted that Congress
could repeal Section 104(a)(2), if it so chose thereby taxing compensation for both physical and
nonphysical injuries within the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment.34 The IRS took
exception to Murphy’s “human capital” argument, pointing that a human has no basis or cost,
nor is it subject to depreciation, in contrast to true returns of capital in the tax sense.35

D. The Opinion of the D. C. Court of Appeals
The D.C. Court of Appeals rejected Ms. Murphy’s first argument. Analyzing the ALJ’s
proposed award, it noted that the damages were awarded because of Ms. Murphy’s nonphysical
injuries.36 Relying on O’Gilvie, the court concluded that the compensation was not paid “on
account of” personal physical injury and thus was not entitled to the benefit of Section 104(a)(2).
Nonetheless, the court agreed with Ms. Murphy’s second argument, relying on the rationale of
O’Gilvie to determine whether the compensatory damages awarded were a substitute for a
normally untaxed personal quality, good, or asset.37 The Murphy court also relied on an Opinion
issued in 1922 by the IRS.38 According to this Opinion, defamation was akin to invasion of a
personal right and since this right was not transferable, there could be no correct estimate of the
32

Id. at 685, see also Susan Kalinka, Murphy: Is Code Sec 104(a)(2) Constitutional?, TAXES-THE TAX MAGAZINE,
Nov. 2006, at 7.
33
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84, 86-87.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Murphy,460 F.3d at 84.
37
Murphy,460 F.3d at 85.
38
See Sol. Op. 132, I-1 CB 92, 93-94 (1922).
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money value of the invaded right. On this reasoning, the Opinion held that damages received for
invasion of such a right did not result in any gain or profit that could be taxed.39 The court then
concluded that if the award was “in lieu” of something normally untaxed, as had been the case
with other awards similar to that of Ms. Murphy’s, then the award was not within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment and was not subject to tax.40 Therefore, the court remanded the case to
the district court for an order entering judgment in favor of Ms. Murphy.
The Murphy judgment came under sharp criticism from various quarters.41 Apparently in
response to that criticism, the DC circuit vacated its earlier judgment and decided to rehear the
matter en banc.42 Upon rehearing, the court rejected all the arguments of Ms. Murphy and
affirmed the judgment of the district court.43 It is not clear whether the taxpayer will appeal to
the Supreme Court or whether on appeal the Court will agree to hear the matter. In spite of this,
it is clear that Murphy revived an old debate that is better understood after a discussion of a few
related perspectives.

39

Id.
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 89.
41
See supra note 8.
42
Murphy v. IRS, Not reported in F. 3d, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).
43
Murphy v. IRS, Not reported in F. 3d, No. 05-5139, 2007 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. July 3, 2007).
40
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CHAPTER 3
Discussion

A. The Constitutional Law Perspective
The United States Constitution is the fundamental source of all laws enacted by
Congress. Thus, Congress’s lawmaking power cannot exceed constitutional limits.44 For an
understanding of such an expansive, yet not unlimited, power and a proper contextualization of
the Murphy case, it is imperative to understand the gradual evolution of the congressional power
to tax.

1. A Brief History of the Taxing Power of Congress
Beginning 1781, the Articles of Confederation, or the first American constitution, gave
birth to the idea of fiscal powers to the United States.45 This was important since, according to
one leading commentator, taxation was at the very center of popular consciousness and the break
with Britain was motivated largely by this issue.46 However, on closer scrutiny it would appear

44

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (holding that every law enacted by Congress must be
based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution).
45
See Articles of Confederation, art. VIII (1781) which provided that “ All charges of war, and all other expenses
that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress
assembled shall be defrayed out of common treasury which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to
the value of all land within each State, granted or surveyed on any person, as such land and the buildings and the
improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall
from time to time direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid in levied by the authority and
direction of the legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress
assembled.” See also Articles of Confederation, art. II (1781) which showed signs of weakness of the then Congress
by reading that “Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and
right, which is not by the confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.”
46
See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7(1999) (discussing the origins of
the constitutional underpinnings of the congressional power to tax).

9

that the Articles of Confederation did not provide the federal government with any real or
enforceable power to tax. Thus the Government had to rely on the good will of its citizens to
obtain the funds necessary to fulfill its obligations and basic functions.47 This soon led to
dissatisfaction among the federalists, for the taxing scheme provided the Continental Congress
with the power to requisition the states for revenue but there was no mechanism to enforce the
corresponding obligation upon them. The federalists indeed wanted a Constitution that would
give a nearly unlimited taxing power to the central government.48 According to Alexander
Hamilton, for example, taxing power was one of the necessary powers for an energetic
government.49 He argued that the resources of the community, and not the Constitution, should
limit the taxing power.50 Anti-federalists, on the other hand, fearfully argued that the Congress
could use taxation to turn a federation into a consolidated government drawing all other powers
as a corollary to taxing power.51 After a near tug-of-war, the federalists eventually prevailed and
their victory sign was codified as following:
Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises. . .52

47

See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN.
L. REV. 1, 21 (1992) (observing that the government could not long survive under these conditions and thus the
Constitution remedied this problem by giving Congress the power to tax).
48
See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Unconstitutional?, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2346 (1997).
49
Id. n.61 (“[T]hey ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to
satisfy them.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
50
Id. n.62 (“Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its
life and motion and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a
regular and adequate supply of revenue, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an
indispensable ingredient in every constitution.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
51
See Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from the Articles of Confederation into the
Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 509 nn. 222- 223 (2003-2004).
52
U.S. CONST. art I, §8, cl. 1. It is interesting to note, however, that neither the Articles of Confederation nor the
Federal Constitution provided any justification for such taxing power. Contrast this with the Pennsylvania
Constitution which in 1776 declared “[T]hat every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment
of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expense of that
protection;” and the Rhode Island Constitution which in 1842 expressed: “[T]he burdens of the State ought to be

10

This clause consistently has been construed to mean that Congress’s taxing power is “plenary.” 53
Supreme judicial affirmation of such a congressional prowess was heard as early as 1796. In
Hylton v. United States54, when the Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of taxing
power,55 Justice Paterson wrote in his concurring opinion that “[I]t was, however, obviously the
intention of the framers of the Constitution, that Congress should possess full power over every
species of taxable property, except exports. The term taxes, is generical, and was used to vest in
Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation.”56 In a long string of cases since then, the
Supreme Court has affirmed this broad taxing power of the Congress in myriad ways. For
example, in McCulloch v. Maryland,57 Chief Justice Marshall owed the origin of power of
taxation to the sovereign power of the national government by saying that “But, taxation is said
to be an absolute power which acknowledges no other limits than those expressly prescribed in
the constitution...”58 Later, in Veazie Bank v. Fenno,59 Chief Justice Chase wrote that the very
purpose behind giving broad taxing powers to Congress was apparent from the terms used in the
Constitution and that “[M]ore comprehensive words could not have been used. . .”60 In Stanton
v. Baltic Mining Co.,61 the Court gave more than a reaffirmation to its earlier stance: “. . . [T]he

fairly distributed among its citizens.” See, e.g., William B. Barker, The Three Faces of Equality: Constitutional
Requirements in Taxation, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 9 (2006).
53
See, e.g., LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-1917, at 154 (Henry S.
Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1971) (describing clause as so sweeping that it has seldom been construed as
an interference with any tax measure”), quoted in Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment and
the Meaning of “Incomes”, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1059 n.2 (2001) (continuing challenge to the notion that the
taxing power is plenary and in the process, assigning meaning to the term “plenary” as “without significant
restriction”).
54
3 U.S. 171 (1796).
55
See Jensen supra note 48, at id.
56
Hylton, 3 U.S. at 176.
57
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
58
Id. at 427.
59
75 U.S. 533, 540 (1869).
60
Id.
61
240 U.S. 103, 112 (1912).
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previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress. . . ”62 The
same year, the Court in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.63 held that the taxing authority of
Congress was “an authority already possessed and never questioned,”64 and that even the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment65 did not impair this power.66 Further, in Penn Mut.
Indem. Co. v. Commissioner,67 it was held that “[I]t did not take a constitutional amendment to
entitle the United States to impose an income tax.”68

More recently, in United States v.

Ptaynski,69 it was recognized that the “power to tax is virtually without limitation.”70

2. Constitutional Limitations on Taxing Power and the Sixteenth
Amendment
From the foregoing discussion, it appears clear that Article I, Section 8, clause 1 of the
Constitution gives Congress wide and expansive power to tax. If no other constitutional
provision affected the taxing power, this would clearly be enough to authorize the imposition of
an income tax. However, Section 2, clause 3 and Section 9, clause 4 of Article I require that
“direct” taxes be apportioned among the several states in accordance with their respective
populations.71 Further, Article I, Section 8, clause 1 reads: “all duties, imposts and excises shall
be uniform throughout the Unites States.”72

62

Id.
240 U.S. 1 (1916).
64
Id. at 17-18.
65
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66
240 U.S. at 18.
67
277 F.2d 16 (1960).
68
Id. at 19.
69
462 U.S.74 (1983).
70
Id. at 79.
71
U.S. CONST. art. I.
72
See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 2 at 15 (quoting Justice Chase: “[T]he power of Congress to tax is very
extensive power. It is given in the Constitution with only . . . two qualifications. Congress must impose direct taxes
by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity.”).
63

12

Thus, each and every tax law that seeks to tax income must conform to the dual
requirements of “apportionment” (if the tax is a “direct” tax) and “uniformity.” However, it is
important not to lose sight of the Sixteenth Amendment for a proper understanding of income
tax.

(a) The “Apportionment” Requirement for “Direct” Taxes
The Constitution contains no definition of what constitutes direct taxes. It only requires
that they be apportioned among the several states. In the absence of an express definition of the
term, it would be worthwhile to consider the period of history in which arose. In the original
Constitutional debate, the Founders usually used the term as synonymous with “internal taxes,”
meaning all taxes except taxes on imports or exports.73 The reasons behind including a direct tax
clause are debatable but they point to two broad sources of their origin. First, and the more
obvious source, is the Federalists’ fight over a taxing regime that would allow them to
circumvent the states and tax their subjects directly.74 Such was the importance of their
insistence that the very existence of the Constitution is owed to a great extent to the Federalists’
desire to have supreme authority to tax.75 Another source, which is less obvious, is the NorthSouth tension that prevailed at that point of time over the issue of slavery.76 Thus, it was more
likely the pragmatism of the Founders rather than the actual concrete meaning of the term “direct
taxes” that led to its inclusion in the Constitution.77 It was a coincidence that Hylton again was

73

See Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6-7 (1998) (giving an example to show both the necessity and absurdity of apportionment).
74
See Jensen, supra note 52, at 1068 (showing that the Articles of Confederation had been a fiscal disaster with the
purportedly “national” government's having absolutely no taxing power over individual citizens).
75
See Johnson, supra note 73, at 21 (terming the Constitution as a pro-tax revolt).
76
Hylton, 3 U.S. at 177; see also Ackerman, supra note 45, at 7-10.
77
See Johnson, supra note 73, at 76 (attributing the definition of direct taxes and decision on apportionment to the
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the first case in which the Supreme Court pondered the meaning of the term direct taxes.78
Justice Chase wrote: “I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the
direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax,
simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstances; and a tax on LAND. - I doubt whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United States, is
included within the term direct tax.”79 Justice Paterson conveyed the same idea: “Whether direct
taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax, and tax on
land, is a questionable point.”80 After the civil war, the Supreme Court discussed this
fundamental issue in five cases.81 In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule,82 the Court followed Hylton
in holding that only direct taxes are those that could be easily and fairly apportioned. In the next
case, Veazie Bank v. Fenno,83 the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a ten-percent tax
on currency issued by state banks. Upon a review of the historical evidence, the Court arrived at
the conclusion that personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like, had never been
regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct tax.84 The Court, while affirming that direct
taxes were limited to taxes on land and appurtenances, and taxes on polls, or capitation taxes,
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held that tax on bank notes was in the nature of a duty and thus was constitutional.85 Again, in
Scholey v. Rew,86 the Supreme Court upheld a Civil War Succession tax on real estate received
under a will.87 Lastly, in Springer v. United States,88 the Civil War income tax was challenged on
the ground that it was a direct tax requiring apportionment. The taxpayer in Springer filed an
income tax return, but refused to pay the assessed tax. The tax collector therefore levied on the
taxpayer’s real estate, purchased the property at a tax lien sale, and sought to eject the taxpayer
from the premises. The taxpayer then challenged the tax assessment, levy, sale, and ejectment on
due process and apportionment grounds. Once again, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the tax from constitutional challenge, relying on the lack of clarity from the constitutional
debates, the notes left behind by Alexander Hamilton from the Hylton case, the letters of James
Madison disagreeing with the Hylton case (but recognizing that the courts were unlikely to adopt
his views), the prior practice of Congress in imposing taxes, and the recent decisions in Veazie,
Soule and Scholey. The Court concluded: “. . . that direct taxes, within the meaning of the
Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate;
and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or
duty.”89
This unbroken chain of reasoning continued well past the Nineteenth century until the
Income Tax Cases (Pollock I & Pollock II)90 in 1895 when the Supreme Court briefly revived the
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dormant direct tax clause.91 The genesis of the Income Tax Cases was the Tariff Act of 1894,92
the first non-war income tax enacted by Congress.93 Charles Pollock, a shareholder in the
Farmers Loan and Trust Company, sued the company to prevent it from paying taxes imposed
under the 1894 Act on the income generated by the real and personal property that the
corporation owned. Mr. Pollock claimed that Congress could not constitutionally tax the
corporation’s income from real and personal property without apportionment.94 The Court
concluded that the 1894 income tax, which because of a $4000 exemption amount, affected only
a few taxpayers in a few states, was a direct tax that had not been apportioned.95 The Court
departed from a century long tradition of Veazie, Soule and Scholey and held that apportionment
was intended to have real effect.96 The decisions in the Income Tax Cases97 were not comfortable
ones for the Supreme Court and it took two sets of hearings and opinions for the Court to strike
down the entire taxing statute. On neither occasion was the Court unanimous.98 Pollock I
invalidated the income tax only insofar it was imposed on income from real property.99 The
Court accepted the Hylton dicta that a tax on real estate is a direct tax and saw no constitutionally
significant difference between a tax on real estate and a tax on income from real estate.100 In the
opinion of Chief Justice Fuller, indirect taxes were paid by persons who either could shift the
burden on someone else or were under no legal compulsion to pay. Direct taxes, on the other
hand, were taxes upon property holders in respect of their real or personal property, or upon
income derived from such property in a way that the payment of tax could not be avoided by the
91
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property holders.101 Because it dealt only with income from real property, Pollock I left the
status of a large part of the Tariff Act of 1894 unclear, and the Court was pressured to rehear the
case.102 In Pollock II, heard several months later, the Court held that income form personal
property should be treated the same as income from real property.

103

With income from

property removed from the base of an unapportioned tax, and because the high exemption
amount effectively exempted the ordinary services-provider from the scope of the law, the Tariff
Act of 1894 was gutted in entirety.104
The negative political reaction to the split decision in Pollock I and Pollock II led quickly
to some judicial fine tuning and readjustments.105 On a theory different from Pollock I & II,106
the Supreme Court in Knowlton v. Moore107 unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the War
Revenue Act of 1898108 which imposed an apportioned tax with progressive rates on legatees
who received property from a deceased person’s estate. Again, in Thomas v. United States,109 the
Court deviated from Pollock I & II by holding that a tax on a transfer of stock certificates was
direct.110 The very same year, the Court in Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. Mcclain111 upheld a
tax on the gross proceeds from the sale of sugar. The Court held that the tax was not imposed
upon gross annual receipts as property, but only on the carrying on the trade or business of
refining sugar.112 An array of cases decided afterward signaled that the tide of Pollock I &II was
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receding fast.113 However, Congress wanted to throw the Pollock twins into complete oblivion
by enacting a broad-based income tax.114 President Taft proposed a compromise in the form of a
constitutional amendment which was to become reality soon in the form of the Sixteenth
Amendment (discussed infra). After this amendment, the law seems settled and at least the
Supreme Court does not appear to revert back to the rationale of Pollock I & II, for that would
mean declaring the Sixteenth Amendment itself unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the burden of
having provisions relating to apportionment of direct taxes in the Constitution will continue to
haunt American jurisprudence.115 For example, in Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co.,116 the
Court held that “[I]f the statute lays taxes on the part of the building occupied by the owner or
upon the rental value of that space, it can not be sustained, for that would be to lay a direct tax
requiring apportionment.”117 As one commentator summed up: “[W]e must not forget that as
long as the words ‘direct taxation’ are retained in the constitution, difficulties in interpretation
will arise in future, even if the income tax matter is disposed of.”118
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(b) The Requirement of “Uniformity”
As mentioned earlier, the Constitution provides for two important limitations on the
taxing power of Congress. While the first relates to apportionment of direct taxes, the second
limitation relates to the uniformity of “. . .[A]ll duties, imposts, and excises…throughout the
United States.”119 According to noted Professor Boris Bittker, the uniformity clause is “a
constitutional provision that might have dramatically influenced the structure of the federal
income tax, but that has shriveled away to a mere flyspeck.”120 To prove this point, he takes us
back in history to Pollock I, when it was argued that the 1894 federal income tax violated the
uniformity clause by taxing some corporate income at a higher rate than individual or partnership
income “from precisely similar property or business” and by exempting the first $4,000 of
individual income from salaries and wages while taxing investment income regardless of
amount.121 The justices were equally divided on the validity of these constitutional objections,
but the uniformity clause issue got watered down in Pollock II when on rehearing, the Court held
that the tax violated the direct tax clause because it was not apportioned among the states
according to population.122

According to Professor Bittker, a liberal interpretation of the

uniformity clause could have made exemptions and differential tax rates unconstitutional, plus it
could have invalidated the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income.123

The

Supreme Court had perhaps heard the issue for the first time (even earlier than Pollock I) in
United States v. Singer.124 However, it is Knowlton v. Moore125 that is generally credited with
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settling the law that the Constitution requires only geographical uniformity.126 Rejecting the
construction that the term uniformity related to the inherent and intrinsic character of tax, Justice
White wrote: “That the words “uniform throughout the United States” do not relate to the
inherent character of the tax as respects its operation on individuals, but simply requires that
whatever plan or method Congress adopts for laying the tax in question, the same plan and the
same method must be made operative throughout the United States; that is to say, that wherever
a subject is taxed anywhere, the same must be taxed everywhere throughout the United States,
and at the same rate.”127
From the foregoing analysis, it appears clear that there are hardly any significant
impediments to the taxing power of Congress. The principal message is that most taxing statutes
are not vulnerable to constitutional attack.128 Thus, it is the practicality, and not the
constitutionality of a tax that is paramount.129

(c) The Sixteenth Amendment and the Present Day Conception of Income.
In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment eliminated any remaining constitutional requirement
that taxes on income be apportioned. It provided:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.130
126
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In reality, Pollock I & II had sown the seeds of the Sixteenth Amendment by overruling Hylton.
The original intent was that Congress should have the power to lay taxes without a restraint.
Pollock I & II went against that intent for reasons personal to the judges and not mandated by
constitutional policy.131 In the years that followed, debate ensued to provide Congress with a
necessary basis for a wide-based income tax scheme.132 This resulted into the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. The effect of the amendment was not to grant Congress the
power to adopt income taxes for this power already existed by virtue of Article I of the
Constitution.133 Instead, the amendment simply eliminated the need for apportionment of any
income taxes that might be viewed as direct taxes. Following adoption of the Amendment,
Congress quickly imposed a broadly based income tax.134 It is important to note that the
amendment does not eliminate the apportionment requirement for direct taxes that do not involve
income.135 However, even after eliminating the difficulties of Pollock I & II, problems remained
in determining the constitutional meaning of the term “income” since the Sixteenth Amendment
nowhere defined the term.136 The Supreme Court’s earlier pronouncements interpreted the term
very strictly, limiting it to its plain or ordinary meaning.137 In the 1918 case of Towne v.
Eisner,138 the Court considered the question of whether stock dividends, the source of which was
earnings accumulated before the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment, were income. While
discussing the constitutional meaning of the word “income,” the Court said “A word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color
131
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and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”139 The value of this
case at that point of time was that it effectively determined that statutory and constitutional
definitions of income coincided.140 In another important case of Eisner v. Macomber141 decided
two years later, the Court was confronted with the question of whether Congress could impose a
tax on a stock dividend without requiring apportionment among the states. That is, is such a tax a
“tax on income” (or part of a “tax on income”) exempt from the apportionment requirement that
otherwise applies to direct taxes?”142 The Court, while discussing at length the meaning of
income under the Amendment as well as the statute, said that the question as to what constitutes
income must be decided according to “truth and substance” without regard to “form.”143 The
Court further said that in order to interpret the Sixteenth Amendment, all that was required was a
clear definition of the term “income,” as used in common speech.144 Macomber was criticized
for its narrow definition of income.145 This was evident in Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka.146 when the Court departed from its own precedent and held that capital gains were
income in a constitutional sense because to hold otherwise “would, in a large measure, defeat the
purpose of the [Sixteenth] Amendment.”147 Finally, in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.148
the Court further demolished Macomber by narrowing the holding to its facts and saying: “But it
was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.”149 In this case, the
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catch-all language of Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939150 was in dispute.
Giving full deference to the intent of Congress, the Court decisively held that income may be
defined as “. . .[U]ndeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion.”151 (emphasis added)

3. Constitutionality of Taxing Damages Recoveries on Account of Emotional
Distress
It is a fundamental principle of constitutional democracy that lawmakers must derive
their lawmaking authority from the Constitution. In the present context also, Congress must
remain within the constitutional limits while attempting to tax recoveries on account of
emotional distress.152 However, there is a strong presumption that Congressional statutes are
constitutional and this presumption only should be overcome when Congress clearly exceeds that
limit.153 It also would be important to look for an express provision in the Constitution to
determine whether such a lawmaking power had been conferred on Congress or not.154 Also,
when the constitutionality of a particular law or its provision is in doubt, it has to be shown that
there is no conceivable constitutional basis for the same.155 From the foregoing discussion, it is
clear that a tax on recovery on account of emotional distress would be constitutional if two
conditions are satisfied. First, the tax must not be in the nature of direct tax requiring
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apportionment; and second, the tax must be on a receipt that can properly be qualified as income
and not merely a return of capital.

(a) Tax on Emotional Distress Recoveries Must Not Be a Direct Tax Requiring
Apportionment
As discussed earlier, Congress’s original Article I power gave it the unfettered authority
to tax duties and excises without apportionment.156 However, the requirement of apportioning
direct taxes remains, even though most federal taxes in present times are not categorized as direct
taxes because of difficulties pertaining to the requirement of apportionment, a point discussed
earlier in this paper.157 In the present context, therefore, it must be determined whether a tax on
recoveries for emotional distress qualifies as a direct tax requiring apportionment. If the
recoveries can be attributed properly to a transaction or an activity, then the tax may not be a
direct tax. For example, in Veazie Bank v. Fenno,158 the Supreme Court upheld taxes on gross
proceeds from the issuance of bank notes. Again, in Scholey v. Rew,159 taxes on gross proceeds
inherited at death were upheld. Though the facts were different in these cases, one could easily
see the connecting thread. The tax was not on property per se but on an activity that related to the
property that generated income. Also, the historical meaning of direct taxes has been very
specific and narrow.
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(b) Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Must be in the Nature of
Income and Not Merely a Return of Capital
Though Glenshaw Glass broadly defined income, it could not be said that a recovery of
any kind could be characterized as income in the constitutional sense. As a general proposition,
the tax consequences of a recovery of damages can be determined in part, by identifying the
nature of the injury.160 The question was framed by the First Circuit in Raytheon Production
Corp. v. Commissioner:161 “In lieu of what were the damages awarded?”162 Thus, if the recovery
of damages is solely on account of capital, it can not be taxed; otherwise, it would fall within the
Glenshaw Glass definition of income. In the context of Murphy, one may say that the recovery of
damages for emotional distress would be tax-exempt only upon a showing that the damages
were, in fact, a return of emotional capital, if this term could be properly characterized and
explained. However, individuals are generally not given a basis for their investments in their own
human capital.163 In summary, one must look at a transaction’s substance, rather than its, in
determining the appropriate tax treatment of damage recovery.164

B. The Tax Law Perspective
Section 61 of the Code defines income in a broadly inclusive and non-exhaustive
manner.165 Exclusions, on the other hand, are limited and strictly defined. Thus, post Glenshaw
Glass, almost any kind of receipt or gain would fall within the ambit of statutory definition of
income but the exclusionary provision has to be expressly found within the Code.
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1.

Exclusion for Personal Injury

The roots of the present day Code go back to 1913, but at that time there was no
exclusion for personal injury.166 In 1915, the Treasury Department issued Treasury Decision
2135.167 It stated that monies received by a taxpayer under an accident insurance policy were
income, and that an amount received as a result of suit or compromise for “pain and suffering”
would be treated as income. Although the Treasury Decision 2135 did not specifically deal with
treatment of damages for personal injury, its wording was sufficiently clear to hold all damages
for personal injury, compensatory as well as punitive, taxable.168 A change occurred in 1918,
however, when the Attorney General, responding to a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury
seeking an opinion on the taxation of accident insurance proceeds, urged Treasury to find ways
in which such amount could be excludable from income.169 Though the Attorney General’s
reasoning later was subject to criticism,170 it was accepted and Congress codified the exclusion
when it added Section 213(b)(6) to the Code.171 The new statute provided that income did not
include “[A]mounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen's
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any
damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness.”172 In
1927, the Board of Tax Appeals173 held in Hawkins v. Commissioner,174 that general or
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compensatory damages received by way of settlement for injury to personal reputation and
health caused by defamatory statements constituting libel or slander are not income. The Board
noted: “Even to the economist, character or reputation or other strictly personal attributes are not
capital or otherwise measurable in terms of wealth, notwithstanding that all will recognize them
as important factors of economic success. They are not property or goods. Such compensation as
general damages adds nothing to the individual, for the very concept which sanctions it prohibits
that it shall include a profit. It is an attempt to make the plaintiff whole as before the injury.”175
A turning point came in 1955 when, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court rendered its landmark
decision in Glenshaw Glass, which had important implications for personal injury exclusion
analysis, both physical and nonphysical.176 The Court sanctioned the human capital rationale177
for excluding personal injury recoveries.178 It is interesting to note though that the IRS did not
use Glenshaw Glass to eliminate the nonstatutory exclusion. Instead this decision was used as a
tool to tax punitive damages.179 Then, in Seay v. Commissioner,180 the Tax Court had an
opportunity, for the first time, to address the application of the statutory exclusion to nonphysical
injuries.181 The Tax Court said: “Under these circumstances, we believe that the “personal
embarrassment” was incidental to or in aggravation of Section 104(a)(2)182 personal injuries and
that the entire $ 45,000 payment is, therefore, excludable under Section 104(a)(2). In reaching
this conclusion, we have found it unnecessary to decide whether damages received in settlement
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of a claim based solely upon personal embarrassment would be excludable under Section
104(a)(2).”183 Though not a decision that had a convincing reasoning for its judgment, it
certainly had the effect of merging the statutory physical injury exclusion and the non-statutory
nonphysical injury exclusion.184 Later, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roemer v.
Commissioner185 provided more clarification. In this case, the taxpayer sued a credit company
for issuing a defamatory report that resulted in his being denied several agency licenses. He was
awarded compensatory and punitive damages which he sought to exclude under Section
104(a)(2). The Tax Court held the entire award taxable drawing a distinction between damages
to personal reputation and damages to business reputation.186 Reversing the Tax Court, the Ninth
Circuit held that for tax treatment of damages, the relevant distinction should be made between
personal and nonpersonal injuries, and not between physical and nonphysical injuries.187 In
1986, the Tax Court reconsidered its holding on damages to professional reputation. In Threlkeld
v. Commissioner,188 the Tax Court followed the Roemer approach, allowing exclusion of the
settlement amount allocated to damages to professional reputation.189 The Tax Court expressly
found no distinction between physical and emotional injuries or between injury to personal
reputation and injury to professional reputation. The Tax Court held that the proper inquiry has
to be the “origin and character of the claim,” and not “the consequences of the injury.”190
According to the court, even if lost income is the best measure of damages, that does not change
the character of the claim. To characterize the claim in that case, the court focused on the
183
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taxpayer's complaint and found that the cause of action was malicious prosecution, which would
be classified as a personal injury cause of action under applicable state law. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, adopting the Roemer reasoning.191

2. The Justifications of Exclusion
The most common policy explanations for Section 104(a)(2) are: (1) the return of capital
theory; (2) the involuntary nature of transaction theory; (3) the compassion or humanitarianism
theory; (4) the imputed income theory; and (5) the bunching of income theory192 or the
administrative concerns theory.193
The return of capital theory is powerful in its simplicity and intuitive logic194 and happens
to be the most common explanation for the Section 104 exclusion.195 Return of capital is a
payment received that equals, or does not exceed, a taxpayer's investment or basis in an item.
Under this approach, damage awards are considered a return of capital. When a taxpayer's mental
or physical health is injured, a damage award compensates a taxpayer for the injury and, in doing
so, returns the lost capital. This mirrors a traditional principle in tort law that the purpose of
compensatory damages is to put the injured party in the position that he or she would have been
had the party not been injured. Thus, the damages make the injured party whole.196 This theory
is not without criticism though. In order to have a return of capital, a taxpayer must first have a
basis or investment in his or her body. However, a taxpayer cannot be said to have a basis in his
or her body because human bodies are not purchased. Furthermore, a person's basis in his or her
191
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body cannot be the cost to maintain that body because a taxpayer deducts those costs in the
annual personal exemption. Accordingly, the return of capital theory alone cannot adequately
explain the policy underlying the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion.197 This theory was rejected in
Horton v. Commissioner198 and thus is no longer very relevant.
Second is the involuntary transaction theory which simply states that a plaintiff does not
ask to be injured and thus is not liable for the consequences of injury, including recovery of
damages.199 Therefore, under this theory, Section 104 is analogous to other sections of the tax
code that afford special tax treatment to involuntary transactions.200 For example, Section
1033201 allows a taxpayer to postpone gain after an involuntary conversion of property. Under
this section, if a taxpayer's property is destroyed, the taxpayer can exclude any gain received
from insurance, but only if the taxpayer reinvests the money in a replacement property.202
However, Sections 104 and 1033 are not completely analogous. Even though Section 1033
allows for a postponement of gain, Section 1033, unlike Section 104, does not create an
exclusion from income but rather, provides a postponement of income recognition.
Consequently, this theory is also inadequate for explaining the exclusion under Section 104.203
The third theory is the compassion or humanitarianism theory. Many believe that the very
origin of Section 104(a)(2) is congressional compassion and concern for the injured.204 If part of
a damage award is used for paying tax then the injured taxpayer may not be able to cover the
entire expenses needed for complete medical care. And this would defeat the primary goal of tort
197
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law which is compensation of victims for personal injuries and look as if the government is
engaging, by taxing, in a “vulturous behavior”.205 It also leads to greater damage awards in order
to cover the tax, attorney’s fees and other costs. Thus, under this theory, Section 104(a)(2) is
comparable to Section 101 of the Code206 which provide exclusion for amounts received under
life insurance contracts.207
A fourth possible explanation is the imputed income theory.208 The concept of imputed
income is further subdivided into two types. The first type is derived from the use of “household
durables.” In other words, the owner of a house saves in rent which he or she would have to pay
to a landlord had he or she been living in a rented house. This saving in rent is considered
imputed income. The second type is derived by using one’s own labor. A taxpayer grows
vegetables in his or her garden and the resulting saving is imputed income to the taxpayer.
However, in both cases, the IRS does not include this amount in gross income.209 The imputed
income theory may be used to explain the exclusion of damages from gross income.
A fifth justification is based on the bunching of income theory.210 The gist of this theory
is that it would be unfair to tax damages because the recovery would artificially place a taxpayer
in a higher progressive rate bracket. In other words, if a taxpayer would have received a fraction
of damages each year spread over a long period, this would decrease or even eliminate his or her
tax liability. But because of lump sum payment, the taxpayer might be paying a considerable
amount of tax at a much higher rate in the year of receipt.211 However, this theory has been
criticized because Congress can easily set this problem right by averaging the damage award
205
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over the relevant period. This way, the taxpayer would not have to report the entire award as
income in one particular year.212

Moreover, difficulties with the allocation of awards, for

example between taxable and exempt income, have also been cited as potential justifications for
the current system.213

3. The Amendments in Section 104(a)(2)
(a) Congress’s 1989 Amendment
Throughout the period of the judicial and administrative expansion phase of Section
104(a)(2) marked by Hawkins, Seay, and Roemer, Congress remained silent.214 Then, in 1989,
the House of Representatives proposed an amendment to Section 104(a)(2), repudiating the
courts’ expansive reading. The proposed amendment read: “[G]ross income does not include . . .
the amount of any damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness in a case
involving physical injury or physical sickness . . .” The accompanying committee report
confirmed the House's recognition that courts were interpreting Section 104(a)(2) too broadly.
The Report stated that “some courts have held that the exclusion applies to damages in cases
involving employment discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no physical injury
or sickness,” but that the committee believed this “inappropriate where no physical injury or
sickness is involved.”215 The conference committee rejected the proposed amendment, however,
in favor of a substitute amendment which, in effect, gave congressional approval to the extension
of Section 104(a)(2) to nonphysical injuries: “Paragraph [Section 104(a)(2)] shall not apply to
any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical
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sickness.” The proposal was signed into law as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989.216 Unfortunately, the 1989 amendment achieved expansion by contraction.217 Congress
did not realize that by declaring only punitive damages for nonphysical injuries taxable, it was
impliedly allowing the exclusion of Section 104(a)(2) to apply to compensatory awards for
nonphysical injuries. This was not the intention of the House and gave courts the freedom to
apply Section 104(a)(2) to nonphysical injuries.218 In 1992, the Supreme Court, in Burke v.
United State,219 reaffirmed the statutory requirement that for damages to be within the scope of
Section 104(a)(2), the claim on which the damages were based must be tort or tort-type.220 The
principal contribution of the Burke decision was to set criteria for determining whether a claim is
a tort or tort-type.221 Three years later, in Commissioner v. Schlier,222 the Court added another
requirement to that enunciated by Burke. It was held that the damages must have been received
on account of personal injuries and sickness.223

(b) The 1996 Amendment
Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Burke and Schilier, the House of
Representatives proposed to limit the exclusion in Section 104(a)(2) once again.224 However,
even the amended Code Section 104(a)(2) did not define what “personal injury” or “personal
sickness” meant.225

For an understanding of these two terms one may look at the House
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Committee Report that contains an explanation of the requirement of physical injury or physical
sickness.226 The Committee believed that substantial litigation had resulted in an attempt to
attribute the reason for the award.227 The Report provided that the exclusion from gross income
was not intended to apply to any damages received based on a claim of employment
discrimination or emotional distress. It also noted that since all damages received on account of
physical injury or physical sickness were allowed to be excluded from gross income, the
exclusion from gross income applied to any damages received on a claim of emotional distress
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.228 Moreover, footnote 24 of the Report
expressed the Committee’s intention that the term “emotional distress” include physical
symptoms (e.g. insomnia, headaches, stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional
distress.229 Thus, the Report specifically intended that physical manifestations of emotional
distress should not be treated as a “physical injury or physical sickness.” In other words, it
wanted to ensure a proximate physical impact that produced an immediate physical injury or
sickness (although not necessarily to the plaintiff) in order to have a “physical injury or physical
sickness” from which excludible damages could flow.230 However, the exclusion from gross
income specifically applied to the amount of damages received that were not in excess of the
amount paid for medical care attributable to emotional distress.231 So, if emotional distress
resulted in physical symptoms for which the injured party sought treatment and incurred
expenses, the recovery was excludable up to the amount of the expenses.
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Unlike in 1989, when the Senate had not initially accepted the House version of the bill,
this time the Conference Committee agreed to the House version.232 The Conference Committee
report quoted much of the language from the House Report as the reason why the damages
arising from emotional distress were being excluded.233 The flush language added to Section
104(a)(2) made it very clear that emotional distress shall not be treated as a “physical injury or
physical sickness.”234 Thus, the clear purpose of the new “physical injury or physical sickness”
requirement was to make all amounts received for emotional distress damages, including
amounts received on account of physical manifestations arising out of that emotional distress,
includible in income.235

C. The Tort Law Perspective
Damage recoveries for personal injuries are as old as tort law.236 One of the principal
functions of tort law is to make the victim whole again through compensatory damages.237 In the
case of pecuniary damage, the emphasis is on putting the injured party back in the same
economic position that party would have been in if no loss had occurred.238 Though punitive
damages are an important part of tort law, the present discussion is confined to compensatory
damages. In tort law the term “compensatory damages” encompasses recoveries for both
economic harms (such as medical expenses, lost wages, and earning capacity) and noneconomic
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harms (such as pain and suffering, and humiliation).239 The fundamental aim of tort law is to
create disincentives to socially harmful conduct.240 The interconnection between tax law and tort
law is important since the Burke judgment effectively limited the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion to
damages received on account of a claim that redresses a tort-like personal injury.241 This was
contrasted with legal injury of an economic character.242
As noted earlier, through successive amendments in Section 104(a)(2), its scope has been
narrowed to a great extent.243

In the present day context, this section provides that only

recoveries for compensatory damages received as a result of physical injury of physical sickness
are excludible.244

1. Tort Law Physical Injury and Section 104(a)(2)
Under Section 104(a)(2), interpretive difficulties exist with regard to the words “physical
injury or physical sickness.”245 Congress failed to stipulate whether physical contact is required
or whether physical manifestations of a nonphysical injury would suffice.246

Also, the

conference report was silent with respect to the presence of physical sickness when the origin of
the action is a nonphysical injury, i.e., sexual harassment resulting in an ulcer or intentional
infliction of emotional distress resulting in suicide.247 Since the amended statute provides an
exclusion for amounts paid for physical injury “or” physical sickness, presumably some portion
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of such awards should be excludable.248 The IRS’s guidance on this issue is limited to a single
private letter ruling.249 The ruling (sometimes referred to as the “Job from Hell” ruling)250
describes a “slow progression” of affronts and injuries suffered by the plaintiff on the job.251 As
per this ruling the plaintiff's relationship with her employer at first had been friendly, but later
came to include lewd remarks and unwanted attempts to make sexual contact, then progressed to
unwanted physical touching without “observable bodily harm.” Later, the employer “assaulted”
the plaintiff, causing “what [she] represent[ed] was extreme pain,” although her doctors found
nothing “physically wrong” with her. During a subsequent road trip, the employer assaulted her
again, “cutting her and biting her.” Later assaults resulted in “skin discoloration and swelling.”
The IRS ruled that the employer's assaults produced physical injury (exempt from taxation when
compensated by damages) only when they reached the cutting and biting stage. The ruling
describes the standard for “physical” injury as “uninvited physical contacts resulting in
observable bodily harm such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding.” While this is a nonprecedent252 position taken by the IRS, it provides a window into the Service's thinking on the
subject.253

2. The Tort Law Emotional Distress and Section 104(a)(2)
The statutory language contained in Section 104(a)(2) reasonably produces two very
different interpretations.254 First, the section might mean that a recovery solely for emotional
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distress unaccompanied by a physical injury is to be treated as a taxable nonphysical injury
award, except to the extent of medical costs incurred in treating the emotional distress.255 Under
this reading, Section 104(a)(2) contains a limited nonphysical injury exclusion for claims of
emotional distress.256 But the language might instead limit the exclusion for physical injury and
physical sickness.257 Under this reading, when a claim of physical injury or physical sickness
includes damages for emotional distress, the only portion of the emotional distress recovery that
may be excluded is the amount received for medical cost reimbursement.258
In tort law there is a common law rule that physical injury or physical impact is a
prerequisite to the recovery of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.259 At
common law, the physical injury/physical impact rule barred recovery for purely psychological
injuries.260 A plaintiff could only recover damages for emotional distress which flowed from
physical injuries caused by a tortfeasor's negligence.261 The common law rule is based on
judges' skepticism about the reliability of evidence regarding the plaintiff's mental state and the
possibility that plaintiffs may be faking emotional distress.262 Because it is usually harder to fake
physical injuries, the physical injury/physical impact requirement was interposed in an attempt to
avoid the problem of proof of injury.263 It is very possible that Congress may have the same
concerns that judges have had with respect to emotional distress that is not attributable to
physical injury or physical sickness.264 Hence, Congress imposed the requirement of physical
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injury or physical sickness for the personal injury exclusion to apply.265 Furthermore, in its
conference report, Congress allows tax-free treatment for emotional distress only if the award is
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.266 This position mirrors the common law
rule that allows damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if the emotional
distress is attributable to physical injury.267

3. The Tort Law Defamation and Section 104(a)(2)
It is interesting to note that the common law physical injury/physical impact rule of
negligent infliction of emotional distress has an exception. Recovery is possible for emotional
distress attributable to defamation.268 The conference report, however, provided that the
exclusion does not apply to injury to reputation accompanied by a claim of emotional distress,
thus departing from the common law tort rule in the case of defamation.269

D. The Employment Law Perspective
1. Wrongful Discharge
Damages for wrongful discharge from employment can be recovered under both tort and
contract law.270 In Byrne v. Commissioner,271the taxpayer was fired by her employer under the
suspicion that she had cooperated with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which was investigating the employer for possible wage disparity.272 The EEOC
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concluded that the taxpayer’s discharge of Byrne was calculated to discourage other employees
from cooperating with the EEOC investigation.273 Upon the EEOC’s complaint and resulting
compromise with the employer, the taxpayer eventually settled for a lump-sum payment in lieu
of reinstatement and for not suing her employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act.274 The Tax
Court estimated that the claims settled were tort-like claims to the extent of fifty percent (the
other fifty percent being attributed to contract claims) and therefore half of the payment was
treated as taxable.275 The Third Circuit, reversed the Tax Court, holding that the statutory claim
sought to remedy a statutory violation that was defined as wrongful and thus, the claim was more
tort-like than contract-like. 276
If we apply Burke to Byrne, it seems that damage awards based on wrongful discharge
claims received under the Fair Labor Standards Act should be tax-exempt277 because a wrongful
discharge claim provides relief through compensatory and punitive damages, and thus redresses
a tort or tort-like right.278 Also, it may be necessary to separate the damages based on contract
rights from those based on tort rights.279 Moreover, an employer’s tort liability is fixed if his
discharge of an at-will employee violates a clear mandate of public policy.280 For instance, in
273
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Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc.,281 the issue of employer liability arose under the Hawaii
Whistleblower’s Protection Act (HWPA).282 The HWPA provides, in relevant parts:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an
employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or
privileges of employment because:
(1) The employee . . . reports or is about to report to a public body, verbally or in
writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or rule adopted pursuant to
law of this State, a political subdivision of this State, or the United States, unless
the employee knows that the report is false[.]283
After reviewing the legislative history of HWPA, the court held that the legislature
intended to safeguard the general public by giving certain protections to individual
employees who “blow the whistle” for the public good.284 Thus, wrongful discharge
actions under similar whistleblower’s protection statues should be deemed tort or tort-like
under the Burke test.

2. Employment Discrimination
Threlkeld v. Commissioner285 became the flag bearer for employment discrimination
damages cases.286

First, Threlkeld noted that lost income was not the sole “measure” of

damages, thus disagreeing with the argument that the damages replaced otherwise includable
income. Second, Threlkeld saw no difference between physical and nonphysical injuries, or
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between professional and nonprofessional injuries. Third, Threlkeld focused on the “character”
of the claim, an amorphous test. This enabled courts to decide employment discrimination cases
in favor of taxpayers, despite the fact that large components of most employment discrimination
awards confiscated back pay.287 However, judicial concern about back pay awards continued.288
In some cases289 where taxpayers had recovered back wages and other damages under a single
anti-discrimination statute, courts bifurcated the damages into a taxable “contractual” component
(back pay) and a nontaxable “tortuous” component (often the portion the underlying statute
termed “liquidated damages”).290
Damages from some, but not all, employment discrimination claims may be said to have
been received on account of personal injury or sickness and thus qualify in their own right for the
Code Section 104(a)(2) exemption.291 Some of them are discussed briefly.

(a)The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Claims
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act292 (“ADEA”) prohibits age-based
discriminatory practices involving hiring, firing, and compensation.293 ADEA is an example of a
statute offering both back pay and liquidated damages.294 Under this, a victim of willful
discrimination is entitled to “liquidated damages” in an amount equal to the back pay awarded.295
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Rickel v. Commissioner296 was the first ADEA case heard by the Tax Court. Following earlier
cases involving other anti-discrimination statutes, the Tax Court distinguished between the two
types of damages awarded and held only the wage-related damages taxable. The court found that
liquidated damages were excludable from income under Section 104(a)(2) as damages received
for personal injuries. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, allowing exclusion of all of the
damages on the theory that the nature of an age discrimination claim is personal injury.297 In
Downey v. Commissioner298 an airline pilot sued his employer for wrongful discharge and
violations of ADEA. The Tax Court held that the entire settlement payment was excluded under
Secition 104(a)(2).299 While holding so, the court overruled its own conclusion in Rickel that that
back pay or nonliquidated damages based on back pay received on account of claim under the
ADEA are not excludable under Section 104(a)(2)300 and stated that:
[The] petitioner's claim . . . arose not because [the employer] allegedly breached
some contractual obligation to petitioner but because [the employer] allegedly
breached its duty under the ADEA not to discriminate on the basis of age. [The
employer's] duty under the ADEA not to discriminate does not depend on a
contractual relationship with petitioner. . .301
Thus, the ADEA compensation scheme evidences a tort-like conception of injury remedy.302

(b) Title VII Claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In Burke, the United States Supreme Court ruled that sexual discrimination claims
brought under pre-1991 Title VII303 were not tort or tort-like claims.304 Since the remedies for
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pre-1991 Title VII claims were limited to back pay awards and injunctive relief, the claims were
deemed not to redress tort or tort-type rights. Therefore, the settlement payments awarded to the
claimants were not excludible from gross income. Decisions following the Burke opinion also
ruled that pre-amendment Title VII claims are not qualified tort or tort-like claims for the Section
104(a)(2) exclusion.305 Burke can be viewed as a limitation on the favorable tax treatment of
Title VII actions. However, certain post-amendment Title VII claims will most likely qualify as
tort or tort-like claims.

(c) Equal Pay Act Claims
The Equal Pay Act306 (EPA) amended the Fair Labor Standards Act and outlaws
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex. Damages available under the EPA include back wages
and liquidated damages. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined
that these liquidated damages were intended to compensate for nonpecuniary harms such as pain
and suffering and for pecuniary losses that are too difficult to measure.307 In Thompson v.
Commissioner,308 the taxpayer was an employee in the government printing press, and she
brought a claim of sexual discrimination under Title VII and the EPA.309 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court, ruling that while liquidated
damages were excluded from gross income, an award of back pay under the EPA would not
qualify for the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion. The court distinguished an award received as

303

Id.
Id.
305
See, e.g., Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1993); Hubbard v. Administrator,
Envtl. Protection Agency, 982 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
306
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56-57 (1963) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(3) (1988)).
307
Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
308
866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
309
Id. at 710.
304

44

compensation for services rendered from compensation for the inability to earn an income due to
the tortious action of a defendant. The court said:
The back pay award was simply recovery for earned, but unpaid, wages which
distinguishes her award of back pay from awards for lost wages or lost income in
traditional personal injury/tort actions. [Thompson] received compensation for
services rendered whereas a tort plaintiff receives compensation for the inability
to earn an income due to the tortious action of a defendant.310

However, the Tax Court later rejected similar reasoning when it analyzed the ADEA claim in
Downey. Downey concluded that the ADEA created a statutory duty on the employer to not
discriminate based upon age. The court recognized that the EPA creates a similar statutory duty
involving sex discrimination. Therefore, the Tax Court is likely to rule that back pay awards
under the EPA are excluded from taxable income. If the EPA claims for back pay are deemed
similar to the ADEA claims and conclusions of the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit in
Thompson are rejected, the entire award from an EPA claim will be excluded from gross income.
The Fourth Circuit concluded in Thompson that liquidated damages serve as a deterrent to ensure
compliance with the Act and as compensation for injuries too obscure or difficult to prove.
Applying the Burke test, damage awards under EPA claims will be excluded from taxable
income due to their punitive and compensatory functions.
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CHAPTER 4
A Critique of Pre-hearing Murphy Decision

Shortly after it was delivered, the Murphy decision came under sharp criticism due to
court’s inability to see issues in a proper frame of reference.
The court first considered the applicability of Section 104(a)(2) and decided that Section
104(a)(2) was inapplicable since Ms. Murphy’s damages were not awarded by reason of, or
because of, physical personal injury. However, for its reasoning, the court’s reliance on the 1922
IRS opinion311 was not proper as this was issued in the light of Stratton’s Independence v.
Howbert312 and Macomber. The opinion made sense in the light of both cases since they took a
limited approach to the definition of income.313 In view of the expanded definition of income as
given by Glenshaw Glass, the applicability of such an opinion is highly doubtful. After this, the
court questioned the constitutionality of Section 104(a)(2). Ideally, the court should have
explored the Code to see if the damages could be included under some other provision, notably
Section 61. Section 104(a)(2) does not trigger a tax liability.314Instead Section 61 requires that
amounts not specifically excluded by other provisions of the Code should be included in the
income of a taxpayer.315 Even if Section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional, it does not mean that the
damages which Ms. Murphy received could not be included in her income.316 Thus, the D.C.
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Circuit should have held that Section 61, as applicable to the damages in question, and as
amended in 1996 was unconstitutional.317
The court’s constitutional law analysis was not flawless either. The court was mistaken
when it believed that the Sixteenth Amendment constitutes the sole source of Congress’s taxing
power. Congress’s taxing power instead comes form Article I of the Constitution. Also, the court
erred by not properly considering the expanded definition of income as propounded by the
Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass.

317

Id; see also Germain supra note 89, at 75.

47

CHAPTER 5
Conclusions

Upon close scrutiny, one might say that the D.C. Circuit should not have reached the
constitutional question when initially deciding the Murphy case (Murphy I). If Section 104(a)(2)
appeared constitutionally problematic, Section 61 and Glenshaw Glass should have provided
some clues about the problem faced by the court. Even if Section 104(a)(2) failed to provide the
justification to extend an exclusion to Ms. Murphy’s award, it did not follow that Section 61 also
failed. By disbodying Section 61 from its constitutional framework, the D.C. Circuit fell short of
declaring it unconstitutional. If an item of income should fall within the ambit of Section 61, a
decision otherwise would undermine the principles of the Sixteenth Amendment. Thus, it was in
this vein that the D.C. Circuit decided to rehear the case. From a statutory and a constitutional
perspective, the D.C. Circuit’s judgment in Murphy II is better reasoned.
Applying Glenshaw Glass principles, the award received by Ms. Murphy appears to be
income, particularly since there is practically no restriction on Congress’s power to tax. The only
sticking point to this proposition is the human capital theory, but that is problematic for two
reasons. First, it is administratively impractical to measure human capital. Insurmountable
difficulties quickly arise in attempting to do so. If a taxpayer has human capital investment in his
or her own body, the day may not be far behind when a depreciation allowance will be sought on
this capital asset. Second, how does one determine that Ms. Murphy had a return of capital when
she had no capital investment in the first place? For example, can it be said that she extended a
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loan of human capital to her employer when she started to work? Advancing the human capital
theory may not take one very far since Congress can always trump the theory, because direct
taxes, by their definition and explanation, have never included taxes on human capital.
The issue then becomes political. Does Congress want this exclusion to extend to
damages received on account of emotional distress? If it does, it can. Not all taxes are justifiable
and not all of them are based on solid logic or perfect reasoning. Taxing is a blunt function of
government and to expect sophistication or perfectly rational and scientific theories to support it
would be a fallacy. Having said this, Congress has much leeway to address the issue decisively,
in a victim-friendly manner, especially under the whistle-blower statutes. Congress has the
legitimate power to tax recoveries received on account of emotional distress, but it needs to find
the fine balance between that power and the responsibility that comes with it. The issue is one of
policy, and Congress should take policy considerations of this type into account.318 Murphy II
might rightly be seen as a corrective course of action undertaken by the D.C. Circuit in the wake
of wide ranging criticism of Murphy I. This will, however, not undermine the importance of
Murphy I in showing to Congress the policy concerns on the basis of which any changes in law
might be desirable. Courts may not be the right kind of forums to address this concern but
Congress certainly is. Thus, the issue would be removed from the “docket” to the “ballot box,”
and the issue would be decided once and for all.
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